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Abstract
It is part of the phenomenology of perceptual experiences that objects seem to 
be presented to us. The first guide to objects is their perceptual presence. 
Further reflection shows that we take the objects of our perceptual experiences
to be among the causes of our experiences. However, not all causes of the 
experience are also objects of the experience. This raises the question 
indicated in the title of this paper. We argue that taking phenomenal presence 
as the guide to the objects of perception, we can see that at least in two 
sensory modalities, smell and touch, there is no uniform answer to this 
question. The objects of olfactory and tactile experiences can move along the 
causal chain. Accordingly, the content of olfactory and tactile experience may 
vary.
0. The content of perception
By ‘perceptual experiences’ we mean here experiences associated with the process of 
apparently gaining information through the five external senses: vision, hearing, 
touch, smell, taste. Perceptual experiences form a variety of sensory experiences in 
general; other varieties may include experiences that are not clearly associated with 
the process of external perception. In visual or auditory imagining, experiences are 
not produced by external senses. Bodily sensations, possibly some types of emotional 
experiences, or experiences of the passage of time may involve sensory modalities 
other than those associated with the five external senses. 
Perception provides our primary access to the contingent features of the world 
around us, and at the first sight, this is what distinguishes perceptual experience from 
other sensory experiences. Through perception, we gain a conception of the world, 
and we acquire knowledge of its nature. The term 'content of experience' may be used 
in different senses (see Siegel 2013), but here we mean by the 'content' of an 
experience simply the way the experience presents the world. Philosophical interest in
this feature is motivated by a number of considerations. 
According to a strong current in the empiricist tradition, perceptual 
observation is the neutral arbiter among different theories of the world. To use Quine's
1  Earlier versions of this paper were presented at a workshop at Central European University, and at 
talks at the University of Bristol and the University of Cardiff. The authors are very grateful for 
audiences for their comments.  Research for this paper has received funding from the European 
Commission’s Seventh Framework Programme FP7/2007-2013 under grant agreement no. FP7-
238128, and from the project BETEGH09 supported by MAG Zrt.
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metaphor, theories face “the tribunal of experience”. The metaphor suggests that we 
expect the tribunal to be impartial among the different theories. But is this expectation
well founded? It has been suggested that the sharp distinction between raw and 
uninterpreted perceptual observation on the one hand, and subsequent theorising on 
the other, is untenable. According to this suggestion, the way we see the world, the 
way it appears to us, is already a result of joint work between theory and observation. 
This is one of the important questions about the content of experience: just what is it 
exactly that perceptual experience presents us?
This question has always interested philosophers: below we shall quote for 
example Aristotle's view on the objects of perceptual experience. However, it is worth
mentioning some factors in and outside philosophy that have shaped the recent 
development of the issue. Starting already in the 19th century, the empirical study of 
perception in cognitive psychology and later, in the 20th century, in neuroscience, has 
became a huge enterprise, and we have now extensive experimental data and a whole 
array of theories about the psychological and physiological aspects of perception. We 
now know that the seemingly simple act of seeing an object is made possible by a 
complex operation of the perceptual system, using both hardwired and learned 
mechanisms. This gave a new impetus to asking the question of whether perception 
can be separated from the rest of our cognitive operations. This question, in turn, may 
have far-reaching consequences for our epistemological theories.
Among the senses, vision has always been in the primary focus of 
investigation both in philosophy and psychology. More recently, however, there has 
been a growing interest in the other senses, and it seems that focusing on vision may 
even have distorted our view of perception. As we mention below, some philosophers 
have even considered the view that for example the olfactory sense is not in the 
business of presenting the world at all: olfactory experiences have no content, they are
mere sensations, mere modifications of one's consciousness. We defend a different 
view in this paper. 
1. Causes and objects of experiences
We include under ‘perceptual experiences’ both veridical and non-veridical (illusory 
or hallucinatory) experiences. All successful perceptual experiences have an object. 
This is simply another way of saying that in a perceptual experience, something 
seems to be perceived – what seems to be perceived is the object. Among successful 
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perceptual experiences we include illusions or misperceptions too, that is, perceptual 
experiences where some object is actually perceived, but it's perceived to be different 
from the way it is (so not all successful experiences are entirely veridical). But we 
don't include hallucinations: what distinguishes hallucinations is that the object one 
takes oneself to perceive is not actually perceived; it may not even exist. 2
Our ordinary ways of speaking allow a wide variety of categories to be objects
of perception: a property, a thing, an event, or in that-clause constructions, a fact. We 
see the colour of a dress, we taste a strawberry, we hear the train approaching, we feel 
with our fingers that the surface of the table is smooth. In case of a successful 
perceptual experience (when someone actually sees, hears, smells, tastes etc. 
something), the object of perception contributes to the cause of the perceptual 
experience. There are various views about the relata of the causal relation: they may 
be substances, events, facts, perhaps properties. We want to remain neutral on this 
issue, and would like to formulate our view so that it is compatible with either of 
these theories. For example, if someone believes that the relata of causation are 
events, then we say that when someone sees a glass, the glass is a constituent of some 
event that is the cause of the perceptual experience. From now on, we will say that the
object is a cause of the experience without adding the qualification 'or constituent of 
an event or the fact which is a cause', but this will be understood implicitly. 
An object of a perception is only one element in the causal chain leading to 
the experience. Someone wanted a drink, went to the kitchen to fetch a glass of water, 
the glass is now in front of her, light is reflected from its surface, some stimulus 
reaches the eye, changes are brought about in the retina, impulses are forwarded in the
optic nerve, and so on. On various views of causation, all elements in this causal chain
can be called the causes or 'some' causes of the perceptual experience. That is why it 
is better to say that the object of perception is 'a' cause, rather than 'the' cause of the 
experience. 
It may seem that certain naïve realist theories of perception deny that the 
object of a perceptual experience is its cause, because they would say that the object is
a constituent of the experience, and we don't normally regard constituents as causes. 
This is correct, but there is a way of modifying the claim which gives us everything 
we want, while taking naïve realist views on board. Naïve realists could agree that the
2 The boundary between successful misperceptions and hallucinations is probably blurred; it's not 
clear how serious a misperception can be so that we can still say that some object is actually 
perceived. But even if the distinction is vague, it is still a distinction, and an important one.
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object of perception is part of a causal chain that stands in a close relation to 
perceptual experience; however, on their theory, the final link in the causal chain 
would be not the perceptual experience itself, but rather a brain state that partly 
constitutes the experience. Thus, naïve realists would agree that if no element in the 
causal chain leading to the brain-state is the object of the experience, then the 
experience is a hallucination (this is a sufficient, but perhaps not a necessary condition
for hallucinating). The object of perception is an element in the causal chain leading 
to the experience, or to a brain-state that is a constituent of the experience. In what 
follows, we will mean this disjunct when we refer to the causal role of the object.
It is necessary for a successful perceptual experience that its object is found 
among the causes of the experience. However, it should be obvious that not all causes 
of the experience are also its objects; returning to the above example of seeing a glass, 
what one certainly sees in the situation is the glass, but this cannot be said of the links 
in the causal chain before and after: say, the hand placing the glass on the table, or the 
surface of one's retina. Even if the subject of experience knows that these things 
participate in the causal chain, and hence she can infer to their presence or existence 
from the fact that she has the perceptual experience, it would still not sound right to 
say that these are the objects of her experience.
2. A question
In the previous section, we established that an object of an experience must be a cause
of the experience, but not all causes are objects. Can we say something in general 
about which elements in the causal chain – leading to a successful perceptual 
experience – are the objects of the experience? What is it about the glass, and about 
the surface of the retina, that makes it so compelling that the first is the object of 
perception, and the second isn't? We do not assume that there must be a general 
answer to this question – maybe there are different cases, or maybe this is just a 
primitive fact; but the question is worth asking. 
This issue hasn't received much attention in this general form (and won't be 
resolved entirely in this essay). Some particular cases and some issues in the close 
vicinity have been discussed in some detail, for example in the debate about the 
immediate objects of perception; on this, we will say more in the next section. There 
is a debate for example on the objects of olfaction: do we perceive odours, or sources 
of odours? In the tactile modality, do we perceive the skin or the object touching the 
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skin?
In this paper, we would like to argue that the question concerning the objects 
of a given perceptual modality cannot always be given a uniform answer. For 
example, in the olfactory modality, one can’t say that we always smell an odour, or 
that we always smell the source of odour. We claim that on some occasions we smell 
one, on some occasions the other or both. Perception can take different kinds of things
as objects, in a sense we shall explain below: different elements in the causal chain 
leading to the experience can become the objects of perception. We shall investigate 
this claim in more detail in the case of olfactory and tactile experiences, but we 
believe that similar considerations may apply to all sensory modalities.
If we can answer the question of what the object of experience is, we gain 
knowledge also of the content of the experience. The content is plausibly regarded as 
representing the objects as being in a certain way. If the objects of perception vary, 
then contents also vary.
3. Related questions
Since the possible objects of perceptual verbs show a great variety in a number of 
dimensions, philosophers sometimes raise the question of whether some objects are 
special in a certain sense. First, the investigation has to be narrowed – if possible – to 
what we literally regard as cases of perceiving something. We are not interested in all 
cases when it is simply natural to say that we perceive something. For example, it is 
natural to say that we can see that it's cold outside when we see people hurrying on 
the street huddled in their coats. However, many would disagree with the claim that 
we can literally see temperatures, and would say instead that we learn about the 
temperature in this case by seeing the shapes and colours of people moving. One 
could ask for a general theory of all cases where perceptual verbs take objects in 
natural everyday constructions. This is an interesting question, but not the one in the 
focus of this paper. We are looking for those objects which are literally perceived 
(assuming, of course, that this distinction can be made.)
An issue related to our discussion is the question of which properties can be 
represented3 in experiences in a sensory modality. This issue can be regarded as the 
3 Which properties can be represented – or presented, if someone doesn't want to commit herself to 
the idea that perceptual experiences are representational. Hopefully, taking sides on this issue is 
orthogonal to the question we are asking. Hence we shall often talk of representation and content, 
but what we say should be relevant for those who believe that perceptual experience is not 
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complement of our question concerning which things are the objects of an experience.
Assuming that the content is the representation of things as having certain properties, 
one issue is what kind of properties, another issue is what kind of things can enter the 
content of a perceptual experience. 
Recently there has been a lively debate of the question of which properties are 
represented in experience. The debate is largely concerned with visual experiences, 
where on one side of the debate we find claims that visual experiences represent only 
a limited range of properties: colours, shapes, motion, perhaps a few more, while on 
the other there are views according to which visual experiences can represent 
properties like that of being a tree or of being a house.4 Susanna Siegel, who defends 
the second, more liberal view, discusses for instance the case of someone who 
gradually develops a recognitional capacity for pine trees (Siegel 2006, e.g. pp. 491-
500). Siegel thinks that while previous to this development, the subject may have 
represented only the shape and colour of pine trees in her experiences, once 
something’s being a pine tree becomes visually salient to her, this feature becomes 
part of the content of her visual experiences. There are some notable differences 
between the case of representing properties and representing things, but these 
differences aside, we believe that in some circumstances, a similar phenomenon 
occurs in connection to the things that are the objects of our experiences. And as we 
shall see below, there are important parallels between the issues of which properties 
and which things enter the content of a perceptual experience.
A further question about the objects of perception concerns the proper objects 
of a sense, that is, the objects that can be perceived by that sense only;5 for example,   
smells can arguably be perceived only by the olfactory sense. Yet another question is 
about the primary objects of perception: these are objects that are always perceived 
whenever something is perceived in a sensory modality. For example, people have 
argued that whenever we hear something, we always hear a sound – indeed, if we hear
anything, we hear it by or in virtue of hearing a sound. As David Sanford (1976) 
makes it clear, though sounds are also proper objects of hearing, being proper and 
representational (e.g. Travis 2004).  
4 An example of the former, called sometimes 'sparse' or 'conservative' view, is Tye (1995, pp. 140-
141). Some of the recent defenses of the 'rich' or 'liberal' view include Siegel (2006) and Bayne 
(2009). 
5 See Sanford (1976), p. 190. The question goes back to Aristotle's theory of 'proper sensibles'. It is 
sometimes thought to have significance for the issue of distinguishing different sensory modalities 
from each other; see Nudds (2004).
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being primary are different conditions; something could be specific to a sense yet not 
involved in every experience through that sense, and something could be involved in 
every such experience without being specific to that sense.
Proper and primary 'objects' are sometimes conceived as qualities: for 
example, when it is claimed that colours are proper objects of vision. In this case, 
'object' is not an ontological category, but simply signals that something is perceived 
in a certain modality. But proper and primary objects need not always be qualities. A 
'sound' can be understood as a spatio-temporally located physical existent.6 Similarly, 
smells or tastes (or perhaps 'odours' and 'flavours') can be understood not as qualities, 
but as quantities of certain chemicals. If we wanted to find an equivalent of sounds, 
odours and flavours in the visual modality, it would be something like a coloured 
expanse, rather than simply a colour.
Developing a theory of the proper and primary objects of perception – if it can
be done – goes some way towards answering our question, but doesn't go the whole 
way. For one thing, saying that a coloured expanse is the proper and primary object of
sight doesn't answer the question of why it is the glass we see, but not the retina or 
the glassmaker, given that all three have coloured surfaces. Further, we are interested 
in all objects of perception, including improper and secondary ones, and anyone who 
allows for such objects will still have to single out some elements in the causal chain. 
Finally, our question stands even if there are no proper and primary objects of 
perception. So the debate about the proper, primary or direct objects of perception, 
though relevant to our purposes, is not exactly what we are interested in.
4. Objects of olfactory experiences
Our question was: which elements in the causal chain leading to (the final constituent 
of) perceptual experiences are the objects of experience? That is, where, along the 
causal chain, do we locate the experience-independent thing that we perceive? We do 
not have a general explanatory answer to this question, but we have a claim that puts a
constraint on possible explanation: that within at least some sensory modalities, 
different kinds of things can be the objects of a perceptual experience.7 Let us 
6 This question is discussed for example in O'Callaghan (2007).
7  The phenomenon is general: given that some bodily sensations arguably have an object, the same 
observation applies to bodily sensations too. In this paper, we focus mainly on perceptual 
experiences, but we discuss for example tactile sensations (i.e. awareness of bodily parts in the 
tactile mode), since they have a very intimate connection with external tactile perception. 
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illustrate this first on the example of olfactory experiences.
On some views, olfactory experiences have no object. Christopher Peacocke, 
for instance, allows for the possibility that “a sensation of smell (…) may have no 
representational content of any sort, though of course the sensation will be of a 
distinctive kind” (1983, p. 5). As 'content' is used in this paper, if the sensation has no 
content, it has a fortiori no object either.
William Lycan in “Layered Perceptual Representation” considers a different 
view:
(...) there are objects other than roses that set off the rose smell – 
artificial rose smells can be made of any substance whose molecules 
are shaped similarly to those of roses. The point is not that the nose can
be fooled. Au contraire; it is that in the artificial case, the nose is not 
fooled, and the rose smell is not incorrectly tokened. An artificial rose 
that produces the rose smell is smelled correctly, for it does have that 
smell even though it is not a rose. (Lycan 1996, p. 90)
Someone who accepted this line would agree that we often classify particular smells 
with respect to the objects likely to give out those smells – in this case with reference 
to roses. However, she would think that we correctly say that we smell ‘rose smell’ 
whenever rose odour is present; hence our experiences are correct or incorrect not 
with respect to roses, but rather with respect to rose odour. Therefore odours are better
candidates for being the objects of olfactory experiences.
At the end, however, Lycan turns against the view that the objects of olfactory 
experiences are only odours. Lycan is persuaded here by Ruth Millikan's 
teleosemantics-based arguments. On the teleosemantics story, perception indicates for 
the organism the presence of those things which are useful for its survival, and in the 
case of olfaction, these things are presumably not odours, but the source of odours. 
Hence:
(...) if smells do represent anything, they do after all represent environmental 
objects of potential adaptive significance. Surely that is what olfaction is for, 
to signal food, predators, shelter, mates, and other objects of interest ultimately
derivative from those ...  (Lycan 1996, p. 92)
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However, Lycan is reluctant to give up the view that olfactory experiences represent 
odours, so he settles for a 'multi-object' view: olfactory experiences represent both 
roses and odours, indeed they represent the former 'by' representing the latter. 
The difference between smelling the odour of coffee and smelling a thing like  
coffee in the cup illustrates the sense in which olfactory experiences can have 
different type of objects: different elements are singled out in the causal chain leading 
to the experience. This means that there are different conditions for the experience 
being successful. If the object of smell is coffee, and there is no coffee in the room, 
then any apparent experience of coffee is hallucinatory. But if the object is an odour 
which happens to be emitted by coffee, then an experience can be veridical even if 
there is no coffee around, but only the smell lingers.8
At first sight, this relation between perceptual error and the content of 
experience may suggest a way of finding out what the proper objects of perception 
are: those whose presence and properties are responsible specifically for perceptual, 
rather than other kinds of error. Unfortunately, this observation, while valid, doesn't 
advance the debate at this stage, because we don't really have direct intuitions about 
perceptual error independently of what we take to be the objects of perception. All 
parties agree that in the case of mistakenly thinking that one is smelling a real rose 
rather than an artificial one, there is an error. But the question of whether the mistake 
is perceptual or cognitive, is the same as the question of what the object of perception 
is. 
5. The phenomenal presence of objects
We are interested in the question of which causes of a perceptual experience are also 
objects of the experience. In this paper, we argue that at least within some sensory 
modalities, there is no uniform answer to this question. We have illustrated this claim 
so far on olfactory experiences: the object can be an odour, or the source of an odour. 
Or in any case, these are candidates for being the object of the appropriate 
experiences. But perhaps there is a way of deciding the issue?
8  In fact, the view that smells have no objects at all can be regarded as a ‘limiting case’ of moving up
in the causal chain, closer and closer to the experience (or relevant brain state). Perhaps one could 
extend the argument of this paper to show that moving from a pure qualitative condition to an 
experience with some content is a process in some ways similar to the process of the object moving 
along the causal chain.
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There is a suggestion we may want to pick up from the previous section. 
Perhaps teleosemantic theories can give a principled answer to the question of where 
to locate the objects of perception: namely, where objects of ‘potential adaptive 
significance’ are found. For example, in the case of auditory perceptions, the presence
of the thing emitting a sound is presumably more significant for survival than the 
presence of the sound; this consideration then would rule in favour of regarding 
things, rather than sounds, as the object of auditory experiences. If other reductive 
theories of content – theories that attempt to reduce intentional content to causal-
nomological connections – were successful, they would also be contenders for 
locating the objects of perception. 
Reductive accounts of content face many objections, and we think there are 
good reasons to think that none of the theories we are familiar with is completely 
satisfactory. Be that as it may, our approach to this question is completely different: 
we propose to regard the phenomenal presence of the object as our guide in 
establishing what is perceived in an experience. This approach is compatible with the 
eventual success of reductive theories.
To introduce the idea, let us reflect for a moment on how reductive accounts of
intentional content are developed and evaluated. Take for example Fodor's discussion 
in Psychosemantics (Fodor 1987, chapter 4). Fodor's question is somewhat different 
from ours: he wants to know how mental symbols represent properties, and he is 
interested not only in perceptual experiences, but in mental states in general. 
Nonetheless, as we shall see, the issue is straightforwardly relevant to our problem as 
well. Fodor first considers the suggestion that whatever causes the tokening of a 
mental symbol is represented by that symbol. This would have the result that 
tokenings of a certain symbol, say HORSE, represents horses and cows-in-the-dark. 
This is clearly unacceptable, says Fodor, and we all agree. Another, similar objection 
may be that if experiences (conceived either as tokening of mental symbols or in 
another way) represented their causes, then visual experiences could represent states 
of the retina. This is clearly unacceptable too. 
The question is: why are these consequences unacceptable? It seems that even 
before we start to design a systematic theory, we already have some idea of what is, 
and what can possibly be – or cannot possibly be – the object of a perceptual 
experience or the content of a representation. We know that the object of an olfactory 
experience of a rose smell is not the surface of the inside of our nose, nor it is the 
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gardener who planted the rose. If a theory had that consequence, it would probably 
count as a reductio against that theory.
Where do these initial ideas about the objects of experiences come from? We 
propose to further elaborate the matter by an appeal to the phenomenal character of 
experiences. That is, we assume, along with many other philosophers, that the nature 
of a perceptual – and in general, sensory – experience is given by its phenomenal 
character. The question about the objects of perception arises precisely because it is 
part of the phenomenology of perceptual experiences that they seem to present to us 
objects as being in a certain way. All further investigations are shaped by this initial 
observation.
The object of a perceptual experience is what seems to be present when having
that experience. In other words, it is the object that is phenomenally present. This is 
clearly not an attempt at a reduction: indeed, the claim is almost tautological. 
However, it is still important, because we implicitly rely on it when evaluating 
theories of perception or intentionality. Whatever account of perception we give, one 
of the data we have to account for is that we see the glass in front of us, but we don’t 
see the optic nerve, nor the hand that placed the glass here.
There are various notions, like 'signalling' or 'carrying information' that may 
adequately cover the relation between a perceptual experience and any member of the 
causal chain that leads to the experience. Perhaps experiences carry information about
states of the retina, states of the optic nerve; perhaps a visual experience of the lights 
being on next door signals that the neighbour is at home. But the reason why we say 
that neither the retina, nor the neighbour is the object of the perception – that we don't
see the retina or the neighbour – is that they are not phenomenally present in the 
experience. We don't seem to see these things when having the experience – we see 
(or at least seem to see) simply the lights. 
The idea that the objects of perception are phenomenally present in an 
experience is meant to be compatible with pretty much any theory of perceptual 
experience. Suppose we accept a representationalist theory of perception, which holds
that the nature of a perceptual experience is determined by its representational 
properties, which, in turn, determine the accuracy conditions for the experience. A 
particular visual experience is of a glass, because the experience is veridical if the 
glass – rather than the retina, or the glass-maker – has certain properties. Of course, 
we might agree with that. But how did the representationalist know where to look for 
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the accuracy conditions? Why didn't she suggest that the experience is veridical if the 
retina is in a certain state? The simplest answer, we suggest, is that the retina doesn't 
seem to be the object of the experience – in other words, it's not phenomenally present
in the experience.9
Appealing to the idea of phenomenal presence is not going to settle all issues 
about the objects of perception. First, there may not always be a consensus on what is 
phenomenally present in someone's experience. Each of us has to rely on their first-
person reports, and some people may be better than others in attending to the 
phenomenal features of their experiences. In some cases, there may be some 
uncertainty at first whether something is phenomenally presented in an experience or 
its presence is evoked as a result of some association, and then different kinds of 
considerations might be used to decide the question. Besides, as we noted, the 
guidance of phenomenal presence is compatible with many, otherwise different 
theories, so clearly, not all questions will be solved this way.
But even if there will be unclear cases, it seems obvious that there are clear 
cases as well. As we said before, most philosophers will agree that one's own 
olfactory bulb is normally not the object of an olfactory experience. To argue that the 
olfactory bulb is the object of an olfactory experience requires significant further 
work. So it seems that we do use the condition of phenomenal presence as the default 
position  to exclude certain objects as candidates for being the object of a perceptual 
experience. 
 
6. Phenomenal presence and different kinds of objects
It's part of the phenomenology of perceptual experiences that objects seem to be 
presented to us; so the first and foremost clue when locating the objects of perceptual 
experiences is to see what is phenomenally present in our experiences. And our reason
for insisting that perceptions can take different kinds of objects in a given modality is 
that we think that these different kinds of things can all have the appropriate 
phenomenal presence in our perceptual experiences. Without a further argument 
against these things being the object of an experience, we suggest we should take 
phenomenology at face value.
To clarify: we do think that for any particular episode, one can single out the 
9 A similar notion of phenomenal presence is used for a similar purpose – ie to locate objects of 
representation among the many causes of representation – by Galen Strawson in Strawson (2008).
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perceived object(s) among the causes. We don’t think that the very same token 
olfactory experience can take an odour or a flower as its object, depending on some 
further factors. When we argue for the possibility of different kinds of objects, we 
merely say that we cannot in general establish that all olfactory experiences take only 
one or other kind of thing as their object.
Compare two situations: you enter a room and an unexpected smell hits you – 
or you enter a room and you smell coffee; we say that from a phenomenological point 
of view, the odour and the coffee are present in your experience in the same 
apparently unmediated way. So in the first case, the object is only the odour, in the 
second case, the objects include the source of odour (and possibly the odour as well). 
Another case: you feel a soft caress your arm – or your are searching in your bag for 
your key and suddenly your fingers touch it; in the first case, you are aware only of 
some sensation on your skin, in the second case, (also) of the object that touches the 
skin. Here again, we say that your skin (as you feel the sensation in your arm) and the 
key have the same sort of phenomenal presence, and therefore both count as objects 
of perception. (More on the objects of bodily and tactile experiences in sections 8 and 
9; the foregoing was just one example of how something may be added to an 
experience as an object.)
As these examples show, one factor that often plays a role in determining the 
object of a particular perceptual episode is the totality of our previous experiences. 
Coffee becomes phenomenally salient in our experience after repeated encounters 
with coffee; familiarity with the shape of the key and our purpose in the search makes 
the key phenomenally present. In the second case, the focus of attention is an 
additional factor in determining the phenomenal presence: if we are in an exploratory 
mode, shapes might strike you differently than in the case of an unexpected stimulus.
There are two parts to the defence of the claim that the object of, say, an 
olfactory experience can be located at different points in the causal chain: first, we 
have to show that in some cases, the only object is the odour; second, we have to 
show that in some other cases, the source of the odour is really an object. We need 
both parts, because otherwise someone could hold a view, similar to Lycan's view, that
olfactory experiences always have multiple objects: we perceive the source by 
perceiving an odour. If that was the case, then we could establish uniformly, for all 
cases of the olfactory modality, which elements in the causal chain are objects of the 
experience. But our contention is that we cannot establish this.
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The most plausible cases for smelling only odours are those of dispersed and 
unfamiliar smells. You are walking on a deserted country road and suddenly a 
peculiar, faint and slightly stale smell hits your nose. You have no conception of the 
origin of the smell; the faintness and staleness is characteristic of a lingering smell 
rather than a freshly produced smell. We think that it would be implausible to say that 
in this case, any object beyond the odour itself is phenomenally present in your 
experience.
A different kind of case is when you feel a feel a familiar smell, clearly 
associated with a source, perhaps even answering to some need or expectation. You 
arrive at a friend's house for brunch after a bad night sleep; you smell freshly brewed 
coffee, and you immediately look for the coffee pot.  Maybe this is one of the cases 
that fits Lycan's idea of perceiving objects with potential adaptive significance: what 
matters for your survival that morning is the coffee, not its odour, and this may 
explain its phenomenal salience in your experience. Since the coffee is presented in 
your experience, it is an object of the experience.
7. Unconscious inference or association?
We have been arguing that on some occasions, the object of an olfactory experience is
an odour, on other occasions, it is (also) the source of the odour. This supports our 
claim that within a sensory modality, one cannot fix the object of the experience for 
all cases. Our main argument for claiming that the object may vary from case to case 
is based on an appeal to the phenomenal presence of the object. Sometimes it's the 
odour, sometimes it's (also) the source of the odour that is phenomenally present in an
experience. 
A possible objection is that we don't in fact smell the coffee in the second case,
but we merely make a quick unconscious inference to the presence of coffee, or that 
an immediate association of the smell and the coffee brings the idea of coffee to mind 
(in the latter case, we need not say that any inference took place). Coffee is not the 
object of the perceptual experience, according to this objection, but of a separate 
mental state, probably a judgement. The coffee case then would be similar to the case 
of 'seeing' that it's cold outside: we don't literally see the cold, we only learn that it is 
cold on the basis of a visual experience.
According to the view which is behind this objection, the inference or 
association is unconscious. This is important, because it doesn't seem that in the 
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specific cases we have in mind, there is an intermediate step. The idea of coffee 
comes to you directly upon entering the house, and immediately prompts a reaction. 
(Similarly, to anticipate the discussion of tactile experiences, when your fingers close 
around the key in your bag, the process doesn't seem to consist of two steps: first, the 
identification of the sensation on your skin, and then matching it with an awareness of
the external object. Instead, you just feel the key.)
We do not want to say, at this point, that when you smell the coffee, you cease 
to be aware of the odour, and when you feel the key, you cease to be aware of a 
condition of your skin. In fact, we'd like to leave this question open. What we want to 
say is merely that it doesn't seem that awareness of the coffee or the key is reached 
through an intermediate step. It seems possible to be aware of two different objects 
without the phenomenology of indirectness. An analogous case, involving properties 
rather than objects, might be the example we mentioned above about seeing pine 
trees. Susanna Siegel’s claim that experiences (can come to) represent natural kind 
properties does not entail that when they do, they cease to represent simpler properties
like colours or shapes. If Siegel is right, and when developing a recognitional capacity
for pine trees, you start to be perceptually aware of something being a pine tree, this 
doesn't mean that you cease to be perceptually aware of the shapes and colours that 
determine that something looks like a pine tree. Furthermore, and that’s the crucial 
point, the property of being a pine tree that according to Siegel enters the content of 
the perceptual experience, does not seem to be represented in the content of a mental 
episode as somehow being inferred from, or following upon, the original perceptual 
experience of shapes and colours.
Now back to the suggestion that we don't perceive, but merely unconsciously 
infer, or make an association with, the presence of coffee. Our reply is that this 
objection is based on a false contrast between perception and the involvement of 
unconscious inference or association. If an unconscious inference or association is 
involved in a perceptual process, this doesn't mean that the inference starts from a 
perceptual experience and leads to a separate mental state. It's very much possible that
the unconscious process precedes the formation of the perceptual experience itself.  
There is overwhelming evidence that our perceptual experiences are results of 
a substantial amount of unconscious work performed by our perceptual system. This 
is especially well-documented in the case of visual perception.10 Take for example the 
10 There is a debate about how this 'work' is best characterised: for example, as an
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hollow-face illusion (Gregory 1973, pp. 49-96). The stimuli that reach the sensory 
organ are compatible with both a concave and a convex surface under different 
illumination conditions, and yet the resulting experience is always of  a convex 
surface. It seems that the best way to explain this fact is to assume that our perceptual 
system plays an active part in the producing a perceptual experience. One idea is that 
because of previous experiences of faces which were all convex, the visual system 
'judges' it to be much more likely that the present experience is of a convex surface, 
and hence infers from the ambiguous stimuli to the presence of a convex surface. Of 
course, if there is inference here, it must be unconscious, and some people even object
to saying that the visual system can do anything like judging or inferring, and some 
other expression should be used. Be that as it may, the unconscious inference cannot 
be understood as starting from a perceptual experience and resulting in a separate 
mental state. Instead, the inference precedes the experience itself: there is no doubt 
that we have a genuine visual perception of the face as convex.
The relevant examples vary a great deal, but the upshot is the following. Just 
because unconscious association or interpretation, based on previous experiences, is 
involved in a perceptual process, this doesn't mean that there is first a perceptual 
experience, and then the interpretation produces a separate judgement. The 
unconscious interpretation may well be part of the formation of the perceptual 
experience itself. We need an explanation of why unconscious interpretation in the 
coffee case is different from unconscious interpretation in the case of the hollow face 
illusion; until the difference is demonstrated and shown to have explanatory 
advantages over our proposal, phenomenal presence remains the best guide to what 
the object of perception is. 
We did say above that phenomenal presence may not settle all issues about the
objects of perception. We do insist, however, that it is our primary guide, and if 
phenomenal presence singles out something as an object of a perceptual experience, 
we need further, and decisive reasons to dismiss the testimony of phenomenal 
presence. On this basis, coffee qualifies as an object, and the fact that this is the result 
of an unconscious interpretation does not disqualify its status as object of perceptual 
unconscious inference following Bayesian principles, or merely as a process
conforming to various laws. This debate is not our concern here: we simply want to
rely on the fact that the content of perceptual experiences is not entirely determined
by the stimuli on our perceptual organs, but requires the active contribution of the
perceptual system as well.
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experience.
One question may remain, however: what is then the difference between the 
coffee case and the case of 'seeing' that it's cold? Why doesn't the second qualify as a 
genuine case of perceiving temperature? We shall answer this question in the next 
section.
8. Objects of tactile experiences
In this section and the next we shall illustrate how the object of perception can move 
along the causal chain in the case of experiences in the tactile modality. Philosophers 
have expressed different views about what should be regarded as the object of touch. 
On the most 'minimal' version, the object is some part of the skin: in touching 
something, we feel a pressure on our skin. A possible variation on this view would 
also include the muscles communicating the magnitude of pressure. 
Perhaps some people don't regard the skin or the muscles as proper 'objects' of 
experience;  they may argue that these cases are better described as mere sensations, 
that is, sensory experiences without a perceptual object. We do not need to take issue 
with this, because this way of looking at things still fits our general thesis: the object 
of experience is not fixed for a certain sensory modality. However, what matters here 
is that tactile objects and bodily parts are different links identified along the same 
causal chains that result in perceptual experiences. For the sake of simplicity, we will 
continue talking of ‘tactile experiences’ as covering both cases of bodily and tactile 
perception. 
If  the skin and what’s within the skin are the only objects of a tactile 
experience, anything that extends further than the skin must be the object of a separate
mental state. This is the view held by Fred Dretske, for example:
... even if we can tell the shape of things by touch (i.e., feel that it is square), I 
do not think this shows we feel the object's shape. What we feel when we tell 
the shape of objects in this way is pressure and (if this is really different) 
texture. It is differences in pressure we feel as we move our hand around the 
object that (together with what we know about how we are moving our hand) 
tell us what shape an object is. [...] If this is to count as feeling shape, then 
wine connoisseurs must be tasting colors (Dretske 2000, pp. 458-9).11
11  That is, the claim that extrabodily objects are not the objects of tactile experiences is Dretske’s 
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To be precise, Dretske is talking here about the question of which properties, rather 
than which things are perceived. But there is an obvious connection between these 
questions: perceiving a thing is perceiving it as being in some way, that is, as 
exemplifying some properties. Presumably, the properties that enter the content of an 
experience are the ones exemplified by the things we perceive. Hence if shape and 
texture are not something we literally perceive when having a tactile experience, then 
the object that has the shape and texture is not the object of the experience. 
Dretske’s claim about tactile experiences falls within our discussion from the 
previous section and so all the considerations and conclusions there apply to the 
present case. That is, since objects outside the skin often have an immediate 
phenomenal presence in tactile experiences, on our account, they qualify as objects of 
perception. 
We agree that it would be odd to grant that wine connoisseurs taste colours, 
but we deny that tactile experience of extrabodily objects is analogous to 'tasting 
colours'. First, even for expert wine tasters, it is questionable how much the colour of 
the wine is phenomenally present in a gustatory experience. Take one of the more 
easily identifiable grape varieties, for example pinot noir. It seems conceivable that 
similarly to the example of the pine tree, someone can develop a reliable recognitional
capacity for pinot noir through tasting, and being pinot noir becomes part of the 
content of their gustatory experience. Pinot noir is red, so one can readily identify the 
colour of the wine on the basis of the flavour. But this isn't the same as having redness
phenomenally present in one's gustatory experience: the identification of the pinot 
noir flavour does seem to be an intermediary step on the way to the identification of 
colour.
Why is there an intermediary step? Because it seems that there is no 
phenomenally unified category of the flavour of red (or the flavour of white, for that 
matter). Red wines of different grape varieties or by different makers taste very 
different, and then we haven't even considered other red beverages, like raspberry 
juice or rooibos tea. This is why the identification of colour on the basis of flavour  
seems to us indirect: the flavour that indicates red is too diverse to make it possible 
for red to be presented phenomenally in a gustatory experience. 
view only in case he regards feeling texture as “really different” from feeling pressure. We’ll 
assume here that this is his view while the reader should keep in mind the qualification ‘unless 
texture is different from pressure’.
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To come back to the question we left unanswered at the end of the previous 
section: the same holds for our earlier example of 'seeing' that it's cold. The visual 
appearance of it's being cold is just too diverse to form a category that could be 
directly phenomenally present in experience. We learn that it's cold when we see 
snow, ice, people wearing thick coats, their having red noses and blue lips, their 
breath steaming in the cold air, and so on. There is no such thing as phenomenal 
category of 'the look of cold'.
But the case of felt shapes, textures and temperatures is different. In these 
cases, there is a phenomenally robust quality that is present in tactile experiences. 
That is why we find it overwhelmingly plausible that in these cases, the thing which 
has the shape or texture can be a genuine object of the perceptual experience.
As before, to show that the object of experience moves along the causal chain, 
we need to present instances both of feeling only the condition of the skin or bodily 
part, and other instances when we feel (also) the object that touches the skin. We have
already mentioned a couple of relevant examples. The most plausible cases of feeling 
only a bodily part are cases of unexpected, fleeting and unfamiliar tactile sensations. 
If the sensation is unpleasant – for example a sort of sting verging on the slightly 
painful – then it's all the more plausible that the centre stage of one's phenomenal 
awareness in the experience is taken up by the skin, with no room left for the 
offending object that caused the sensation.
How different this is from a purposeful search among familiar objects. The 
earlier example was searching for a key; another one may be finding the utterly 
familiar location of the switch of your bedside lamp in the dark. It seems to us that as 
soon as one's finger hits on the switch, we do genuinely feel its presence. 
9. Further explored objects
So far we mentioned two categories of possible objects for tactile experiences: bodily 
parts, and objects immediately touching the body. In addition, further explored objects
may become the objects of touch. Aristotle remarks that an object that comes in 
contact with the skin is at once perceived. Furthermore, 
if the experiment is made of making a sort of membrane and stretching it tight 
over the flesh, as soon as this web is touched the sensation is reported in the 
same manner as before, yet it is clear that the organ is not in this membrane. If
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the membrane could be grown on to the flesh, the report would travel still 
quicker (Aristotle, Book II, §11 422b33-423a12).
A contemporary example could be a surgeon wearing a surgical glove. Although the 
glove is the only thing that is strictly speaking in contact with the skin, the surgeon 
can plausibly be said to feel also the shape of the scalpel she is manipulating. More 
striking examples involve putting more distance between the skin and the perceived 
object,  for example in the case of exploring the shape and surface of objects with a 
stick – that is, if one finds the following description by Merleau-Ponty plausible:
Once the stick has become a familiar instrument, the world of feelable things 
recedes and now begins, not at the outer skin of the hand, but at the end of the 
stick. ... the habit does not consist in interpreting the pressures of the stick on 
the hand as indications of certain positions of the stick, and these as signs of 
an external object, since it relieves us of the necessity of doing so. The 
pressures on the hand are no longer given; the stick is no longer an object 
perceived by the blind man, but an instrument with which he perceives.  
(Merleau-Ponty 1945, pp. 175-6)
An interesting example of tactile experience acquiring new objects can be the case of 
the users of tactile visual substitution system (TVSS, see Bach-Y-Rita1996). A camera
records an image which is simplified into a black-and-white pixellated image, which 
in turn is converted into vibratory or electric stimuli produced by a plate against the 
skin of the subject. The subject feels the converted shapes through tactile experience. 
After sufficient training, subjects learn to locate and manipulate objects in space. 
Interestingly
when the man-machine interface, the electro- or vibrotactile array, is moved 
from one area of skin to another (e.g., from the back to the abdomen or to the 
forehead), there is no loss of correct spatial localization, even when the array 
is switched from back to front, since the trained blind subject is not perceiving
the image on the skin, but is locating it correctly in space. (Bach-Y-Rita 1996, 
p. 500)
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On the basis of considerations put forward above, we regard it as plausible that the 
object whose image is conveyed through the array becomes here the object of the 
experience.12
Both Merleau-Ponty's description and the reports about using sensory 
substitution systems raise a question that we already touched upon in passing: when a 
more remote link in the causal chain is added as an object, do we cease to perceive the
more proximate links? Going back to the case of olfaction, the question would be 
whether we cease to perceive an odour, once its source becomes the object of the 
olfactory experience. Or similarly for tactile modality – do we cease to perceive what 
happens to the palms of our hands once we engage in an active exploratory touch of 
an extrabodily object? We cannot settle the question here, but some possible answers  
were already mentioned. Lycan’s layered-representation view of olfaction holds that 
we always perceive the odour as well as the source of the odour. Merlau-Ponty has a 
different view in the case of touch: once the stick becomes a familiar tool, it ceases to 
be an object of perception, and the only things felt are the explored surfaces.
10. Conclusion
It's part of the phenomenology of perceptual experiences that objects seem to be 
presented to us. The first guide to objects is their perceptual presence. Further 
reflection shows that we take the objects of our experiences to be among the causes of
our experiences. However, we do not think that all causes of the experience are also 
objects of the experience. This raises the question indicated in the title of this paper. 
We argued that taking phenomenal presence as the guide to the objects of perception, 
we can see that at least in two sensory modalities, smell and touch, there is no uniform
answer to this question. The objects of olfactory and tactile experiences can move 
along the causal chain.
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